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Bayesian Group Belief
Franz Dietrich1
May 2008
Abstract. If a group is modelled as a single Bayesian agent, what should its beliefs
be? I propose an axiomatic model that connects group beliefs to beliefs of group
members, who are themselves modelled as Bayesian agents, possibly with di¤erent
priors and di¤erent information. Group beliefs are proven to take a simple multi-
plicative form if peoples information is independent, and a more complex form if
information overlaps arbitrarily. This shows that group beliefs can incorporate all
information spread over the individuals without the individuals having to communic-
ate their (possibly complex and hard-to-describe) private information; communicating
prior and posterior beliefs su¢ ces. JEL classication: D70, D71
Keywords: Opinion pooling, axiomatic social choice theory, subjective probability
1 Introduction
Suppose a group is interested in whether a given hypothesis H is true. If every indi-
vidual assigns a probability of 70% toH, what probability should the group as a whole
assign toH? Is it exactly 70%, or perhaps more since di¤erent persons have independ-
ently conrmed H? The answer, I will show, crucially depends on the informational
states of the individuals. If they have identical information, the collective has good
reasons to adopt peoples unanimous 70% belief, following the popular (probabilistic)
Pareto principle (e.g. Mongin (1995, 1998)). Under informational asymmetry, by
contrast, a possibly much higher or lower collective probability may be appropriate,
and the Pareto principle becomes problematic, or so I argue.
The above question is an instance of the classic opinion pooling/aggregation prob-
lem, with applications for instance in expert panels. In general, individual probabilit-
ies need of course not coincide, and also more than one hypothesis may be of interest.
The goal is to merge a prole Pr1; :::;Prn of individual probability measures (on a
-algebra of events) into a single collective probability measure Pr. The literature
has proposed di¤erent normative conditions on the aggregation rule, and has derived
the class of rules satisfying these conditions. The two most prominent types of rules
are linear and geometric rules. If Pr;Pr1; :::;Prn have associated probability dens-
ity (or mass) functions f; f1; :::; fn (with respect to some xed measure ), a linear
rule denes f as being a weighted arithmetic average
Pn
i=1wifi; and a geometric
1A¢ liations: Maastricht University & London School of Economics. This paper uses material
from my preliminary manuscript Opinion pooling under informational asymmetries, 2004
rule denes f as being proportional to a weighted geometric average ni=1f
wi
i ; where
w1; :::; wn 2 [0; 1] are xed weights with sum 1. By contrast, our Bayesian axioms will
lead to what I call multiplicative rules, which dene f as proportional gni=1fi, the
product of all (unweighted) individual functions fi with some xed density function g.
Linear rules have been characterised (under additional technical assumptions) by the
strong setwise function property (McConway (1981) and Wagner (1982, 1985); see also
Lehrer and Wagner (1981)), the marginalisation property (McConway (1981)), and in
a single-prole framework by the probabilistic analogue of the weak Pareto principle
(Mongin, (1995, 1998)); and geometric rules famously satisfy external Bayesianity
as dened in Section 6 (e.g. McConway (1978), Genest (1984), Genest, McConway
and Schervish (1986)). Still an excellent reference for fundamental results on opinion
pooling is Genest and Zideks (1986) literature review.
I claim that the classic approach is problematic if, as in this paper, the goal of
opinion pooling is taken to be information aggregation, i.e. if collective beliefs aim
at incorporating all the information spread asymmetrically over the individuals. The
classic approach is more suitable if the goal is not information aggregation: the goal
might be not epistemic at all (e.g. fair representation), or it might be epistemic yet
with the disagreements between individuals caused not by di¤erences in information
but by di¤erences in interpretation of the same shared body of information.
One might at rst suspect that classic pooling functions can account for informa-
tional asymmetries by putting more weight on the beliefs of well-informed individuals.
More concretely, it is often suggested that in a linear and geometric rule (as dened
above) the weights wi of well-informed individuals should be higher. However, as
Genest and Zidek (1986) put it, "expert weights do allow for some discrimination [...],
but in vague, somewhat ill dened ways" (p. 120), and "no denite indications can
be given concerning the choice or interpretation of the weights" (p. 118).
To concretely illustrate the di¢ culty that classic pooling functions have in aggreg-
ating information, consider again the introductory example. Suppose the individuals i
arrived at the probability Pri(H) = :7 by Bayesian conditionalisation on some private
information Ei, where the Eis are independent across individuals. What should the
collective belief Pr(H) be? If the individuals i started from the same prior probability
p of H, all depends on how p compares to :7: if p < :7 then Pr(H) should intuitively
exceed :7 because Pr(H) should incorporate all the observations E1; :::; En, each one of
which alone already su¢ ces to push the probability of H up from p to :7. By a similar
argument, if H has a common prior p > :7 then intuitively Pr(H) < :7, and if p = :7
then intuitively Pr(H) = :7. If people hold di¤erent prior beliefs, then intuitively
Pr(H) should be higher or lower than :7 according to whether "most" individuals
prior of H is lower resp. higher than :7. These considerations highlight that know-
ing just the individualscurrent (i.e. posterior) beliefs Pr1; :::;Prn does not su¢ ce to
determine collective beliefs Pr that e¢ ciently aggregate individual information. So
our model will have to deviate from standard opinion pooling in that Pr will not be
a function of Pr1; :::;Prn alone. What else must collective beliefs Pr depend on? The
2
example lets us suspect that individual prior beliefs matter.
The paper conrms this intuition generally, by presenting an axiomatic framework
that unlike the classic approach explicitly models the information states of the indi-
viduals. The imposed axioms lead (in the common prior case) to a unique formula
for the collective probability function; no weights or other parameters are needed to
incorporate all individual information into the collective beliefs. For the reason ex-
plained above, the collective beliefs depend not just on peoples actual (i.e. posterior)
beliefs but also their prior beliefs. This increased individual input is necessary and
su¢ cient to e¢ ciently aggregate information, which might come as a surprise. In
short, knowing the (complex) content of peoples private information is not needed:
knowing peoples prior-posterior pairs su¢ ces.
As an alternative to our approach, the supra-Bayesian approach might also be
able to aggregate information e¢ ciently; however, despite conceptual elegance, the
approach su¤ers from some problems, among which practicable infeasibility.2
In modelling both individuals and the collective as Bayesian rationals, our ndings
are also relevant to the theory of Bayesian aggregation, which aims to merge individual
beliefs/values/preferences satisfying Bayesian rationality conditions (in the sense of
Savage (1954) or Je¤rey (1983)) into equally rational collective ones; for the ex ante
approach, e.g. Seidenfeld et al. (1989), Broome (1990), Schervish et al. (1991) and
Mongin (1995, 1998); for the ex post approach, e.g. Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979),
Levi (1990), Hild (1998) and Risse (2001); for an excellent overview/critique, see Risse
(2003).
Section 2 presents the axiomatic model and derives the resulting aggregation rule.
Section 3 gives a numerical example. Section 4 identies our pooling formula as
a form of multiplicative opinion pooling. Sections 5 and 6 address the case of no
common prior. Section 7 analyses the independent-information assumption made so
far. Section 8 generalises the aggregation rule to arbitrary information overlaps.
2 An axiomatic model
Consider a group of persons i = 1; :::; n (n  2) who need collective beliefs on certain
hypotheses, represented as subsets H of a non-empty set 
 of possible worlds, i.e.
worlds that are possible under the shared information. Throughout I call information
(knowledge, an observation etc.) "shared" if it is held by all group members. Let
H be the set of hypotheses H  
 of interest, where H forms a nite or countably
2In the supra-Bayesian approach (introduced by Morris (1974) seminal work and extended in
a large literature), collective beliefs are obtained as posterior probabilities (held by the real or
virtual supra-Bayesian) conditional on the observed individual beliefs (treated as random events
or evidence). This presupposes knowing (i) prior probabilities, and (ii) the likelihoods with which
the individuals make probability assignments. It is not clear where these prior probabilities and
likelihoods can come from; reaching a compromise or consensus on them might involve a more
complex opinion pooling problem than the original one.
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innite partition of 
 and ; =2 H. So, the hypotheses are mutually exclusive and
exhaustive. A simple but frequent case is a binary problem H = fH;
nHg, where H
might be the hypothesis that the defendant in a court trial is guilty. In a non-binary
case, H might contain di¤erent hypotheses on the defendants extent of guilt.
I call "probability function or belief (on H)" any function f : H ! (0; 1] withP
H2H f(H) = 1 (whereas probability measures are, as usual, dened on -algebras
of events3); let  be the set of all these functions f .
Let each individual i hold a belief i 2 , and let the collective also hold a belief
 2 . So far, this is entirely classical. Classical opinion pooling would proceed by
placing conditions on how  depends on 1; :::; n, resulting in a unique relationship
(e.g.  = 1
n
1 + ::: +
1
n
n) or a class of possible relationships (e.g. all linear ones).
For reasons indicated in the introduction, I do not impose that  depends just on
1; :::; n. Rather, I model the informational origins of the beliefs 1; :::; n and allow
them to a¤ect . Specically, for each person i let there be:
- an event Ei  
; is personal information;
- a set of events Ai ( H [ fEig), a -algebra on 
, representing the domain
within which i holds beliefs (i may be agnostic on events outside Ai, he might not
even conceptualise them):
- a ("prior") probability measure Pi : Ai ! [0; 1] representing is beliefs based on
the shared information (hence prior to observing Ei), where Pi(Ei) > 0 and Pi(H) > 0
for all H 2 H.4
These model resources allow us to state a standard rationality condition:
Individual Bayesian Rationality (IBR) i(H) = Pi(HjEi) for each person i and
hypothesis H 2 H.5
By (IBR), individuals form their beliefs on hypotheses H 2 H by Bayesian con-
ditioning on available information. While the individualsdoxastic attitudes might
of course have identical domains (A1 = ::: = An), I have allowed the individuals i
to hold beliefs within di¤erent domains Ai. In particular, a person is belief domain
Ai may fail to contain another person js observation Ej, and this for (at least) two
reasons. First, the fact that j but not i observed Ej may be due precisely to j having
subjectively conceptualised Ej but i not having done so; juror j may be the only juror
to observe the suspicious smile on the defendants face because the other jurors i do
not even know what a suspicious smile would be. Second, js information Ei may
be so detailed and complex that prior to j observing it belonged not even to js own
3By countability of H and -additivity of probability measures, probability functions on H
uniquely extend to probability measures on the -algebra (H) generated by H, and so we lose
nothing by considering functions on H rather than on (H). By denition, probability functions
f 2  never assign zero probability to any hypothesis; this is mainly for technical convenience.
4The term "prior" need not have a temporal meaning: the observation of Ei need not come after
that of shared information.
5The conditional probability Pi(HjEi) is well-dened because Ei;H 2 Ai and Pi(Ei) > 0. Our
assumptions also take care that all other conditional probabilities used in this paper are well-dened.
4
belief domain, let alone to is; that is, it was only while observing Ej that person j
extended his prior belief to the larger domain Aj containing Ej.
Following the paradigm of social choice theory, I treat the collective as a separate
virtual agent with its own beliefs. While this agent is a construction (i.e. there neednt
exist any real individual holding these beliefs), the social choice paradigm requires it to
be as rational as any real individual.6 Rationalityrefers to di¤erent things in di¤erent
contexts (e.g. to transitivity of preferences in the context of Arrowian preference
aggregation). In the present context, it naturally refers to Bayesian rationality. To
formulate this, I suppose that there are
- a -algebra A ( H[ fE1; :::; Eng) on 
, representing the domain within which
the collective holds beliefs:
- a ("prior") probability measure P : A ! [0; 1] representing the collective beliefs
based on peoples shared information (i.e. not on their personal information), where
P (E1 \ ::: \ En) > 0 and P (H) > 0 for all H 2 H.
A and P are collective counterparts of Ai and Pi. The counterpart of (IBR) is:
Collective Bayesian Rationality (CBR) (H) = P (HjE1 \ ::: \ En) for each
hypothesis H 2 H.
Condition (CBR) requires collective beliefs  to incorporate all information spread
over people: the shared information (contained in the prior P ) and all personal in-
formation E1; :::; En.
I denote by p1; :::; pn; p the restrictions of the (individual and collective) prior
beliefs P1; :::; Pn; P to the set H of relevant hypotheses; formally p1 := P1jH; :::; pn :=
PnjH; p := P jH. So p1; :::; pn; p are the prior counterparts of the posterior probability
functions 1; :::; n; . The pair pi; i represents is prior and posterior beliefs on the
relevant hypotheses. With this notation, (CBR) and Bayesrule imply that
(H) =
p(H)P (E1 \ ::: \ EnjH)P
H02H p(H
0)P (E1 \ ::: \ EnjH 0) (1)
for all hypothesesH 2 H. I nowmake an independence assumption to be analysed and
relaxed later; it is analogous to the independence assumption in the literature on the
Condorcet Jury Theorem, to the Parental Markov Condition in the theory of Bayesian
networks (interpreting the true hypothesis in H as the parent of each information
Ei in a Bayesian network; see Pearl 2000), and to Fitelsons (2001) conrmational
independence.
Independent Information (Ind) For each hypothesis H 2 H, the personal ob-
servations E1; :::; En are independent conditional on H; i.e. P (E1 \ ::: \ EnjH) =
P (E1jH)   P (EnjH).
6The collective agent should be rational notably because it forms the basis for collective actions
and decisions.
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Applying (Ind) to (1), we obtain
(H) =
p(H)P (E1jH)   P (EnjH)P
H02H p(H
0)P (E1jH 0)   P (EnjH 0) : (2)
Which values should be used for the collective likelihoods P (EijH)? I claim that the
following principle is natural:
Acceptance of Likelihoods (AL) For all persons i and hypothesesH 2 H, P (EijH) =
Pi(EijH).
This principle requires the collective to take over is own interpretation of is
information Ei as given by is likelihood assignments Pi(EijH); H 2 H. How can (AL)
be motivated? Why not also take other personsinterpretations of Ei into account by
dening P (EijH) as some compromise of P1(EijH); :::; Pn(EijH)? First, for reasons
explained above, persons j 6= i may not even hold beliefs on the unobserved event Ei
(and on Ei \H), in which case Pj(EijH) is simply undened. Second, a "likelihood
compromise" could only be formed after each person j reveals Pj(EijH) (assuming
that Ei 2 Aj); which in turn supposes that rst i communicates his informational
basis Ei in all detail to the rest of the group. This is not only at odds with the
present approach, but may also be infeasible: given the possible complexity of Ei and
the limitations of language, of time, of is ability to describe Ei, of js (j 6= i) ability to
understand Ei etc., j could probably learn at most some approximation ~Ei of Ei; and
so j could at most provide js likelihood of ~Ei; which only approximates js likelihood
of the true Ei (Pj( ~Ei)  Pj(Ei)).
In (2) I may rewrite each P (EijH) using (AL), (IBR) and Bayesrule:
P (EijH) = Pi(EijH) = Pi(HjEi)Pi(Ei)
Pi(H)
=
i(H)
pi(H)
Pi(Ei):
Substituting this into (2) and then noticing that each Pi(Ei) drops out, we obtain:
(H) =
1(H)
p1(H)
P1(E1)    n(H)pn(H)Pn(En)p(H)P
H02H
1(H0)
p1(H0)
Pn(E1)    n(H0)pn(H0)Pn(En)p(H 0)
=
1(H)
p1(H)
   n(H)
pn(H)
p(H)P
H02H
1(H0)
p1(H0)
   n(H0)
pn(H0)p(H
0)
:
In short, collective belief  is proportional to 1
p1
   n
pn
p, where I call functions f; g :
H ! R "proportional", writen f / g, if there exists a constant k 6= 0 such that
f(H) = kg(H) for all H 2 H.
An important case is that where people have managed to agree on how to interpret
their shared information, i.e. if they hold common prior beliefs:
Common Prior (CP) p1 = ::: = pn = p (i.e. the prior beliefs P1; :::; Pn; P agree on
the set H of relevant hypotheses, though perhaps not elsewhere).
6
Condition (CP) can in fact be seen as the conjunction of two conditions. Firstly,
p1 = ::: = pn, i.e. all persons i submit the same prior beliefs. Second, the unanimity
(or Pareto) principle holds for the prior beliefs, i.e. if all have the same prior pi, this
becomes the collective prior p. Applying a unanimity condition to prior beliefs is less
problematic than doing so for the posterior beliefs 1; :::; n; , because prior beliefs
contain no informational asymmetry. (See the introduction and below for a critique
of the unanimity principle under asymmetric information.)
I now collect in a theorem:
Theorem 1 If (IBR), (CBR), (Ind) and (AL) hold, collective belief  is given by
 / 1
p1
   n
pn
p:
In particular, if in addition (CP) holds, collective belief  is given by
 / 1   n=pn 11 :
Three remarks are due.
1. As promised, the collective probability function  is calculated without people
having to share their detailed informational bases Ei or their likelihoods P (EijH); H 2
H. In practice, all persons i submit their prior-posterior pairs pi; i, and then collective
beliefs  are calculated. Compared to standard opinion pooling, we additionally
require submission of prior beliefs pi, a complication that enables the incorporation
of the individual information E1; :::; En into collective beliefs.
2. If (CP) fails, i.e. if the group didnt manage to agree on how to interpret the
shared information, the formula of Theorem 1 does not fully solve the aggregation
problem, because the collective prior p still needs to be chosen, a problem addressed
in Sections 5 and 6.
3. Assume a unanimous posterior agreement 1 = ::: = n (as in the introductions
example). Then only in special cases  equals 1 = ::: = n (showing that the
unanimity/Pareto principle often required in standard opinion pooling is problematic
if opinion pooling is viewed as information aggregation). One such special case is that
1 = ::: = n = p1 = ::: = pn = p, so that none of the personal observations E1; :::; En
conrms or disconrms any hypothesis, i.e., in essence, there is no informational
asymmetry.
3 A numerical example for a simple case
Consider the simple case of a binary problem H = fH;
nHg (H and 
nH might
mean that the defendant in a court trial is guilty resp. innocent, and persons might
be jurors). Suppose Common Prior (CP), i.e. p1 = ::: = pn = p. By Theorem 1, the
collective posterior of H is given by
H =
H1   Hn =(pH)n 1
H1   Hn =(pH)n 1 + (1  H1 )    (1  Hn )=(1  pH)n 1
; (3)
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where pH := p(H); H := (H) and Hi := i(H).
7 For the case of group size n = 2,
pH :
.1 .25 .5 .75 .9
.1, .1 .1 .036 .012 .004 .001
.25, .1 .25 .1 .036 .012 .004
.25, .25 .5 .25 .1 .036 .012
.5, .1 .5 .25 .1 .036 .012
.5, .25 .75 .5 .25 .1 .036
.5, .5 .9 .75 .5 .25 .1
.75, .1 .75 .5 .25 .1 .036
H1 ; 
H
2 : .75, .25 .9 .75 .5 .25 .1
.75, .50 .964 .9 .75 .5 .25
.75, .75 .988 .964 .9 .75 .5
.9, .1 .9 .75 .5 .25 .1
.9, .25 .964 .9 .75 .5 .25
.9, .5 .988 .964 .9 .75 .5
.9, .75 .996 .988 .964 .9 .75
.9, .9 .999 .996 .988 .964 .9
Table 1: Collective probability H = (H) in dependence of the common prior pH =
p(H) and the individual posteriors Hi = i(H), for a group of size n = 2.
Table 1 contains the values of H for all possible combinations of values of pH ; H1 ; 
H
2
in the grid f:1; :25; :5; :75; :9g. Note how drastically H depends on the prior pH :
By shifting pH below (above) the Hi s, 
H quickly approaches 1 (0); intuitively, if
E1; :::; En all point into the same direction, their conjunction points even more into
that direction. But if the prior pH is somewhere in the middle of the Hi s, 
H may
be moderate; intuitively, if E1; :::; En point into di¤erent directions, their conjunction
need not strongly point into any direction. Rewriting (3) as
H =
1
1 + (1=H1   1)    (1=Hn   1)=(1=pH   1)n 1
; (4)
shows that group belief H is a strictly increasing function of individual beliefs
H1 ; :::; 
H
n for xed prior p
H , but a strictly decreasing function of pH for xed H1 ; :::; 
H
n
(where H ! 1(0) as pH ! 0(1)). How can one make sense of the group posterior H
depending negatively on the prior pH? Can more prior support for H really reduce
Hs posterior probability? The answer is that increasing the prior pH while keeping
the individual posteriors H1 ; :::; 
H
n xed implicitly reduces the support that each of
the n individual observations E1; :::; En give to H; and this ought indeed to reduce
the collective posterior H of H, because H accounts not just for one Ei (whose
7The entries are rounded results if 3 decimal digits are reported, and exact results else.
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reduced support for H exactly compensates the increased prior support) but for the
entire conjunction E1 \ ::: \ En (whose reduced support for H overcompensates the
increased prior support).
4 Multiplicative opinion pooling
If we treat the priors p1; :::; pn; p as xed parameters, the pooling formula of Theorem
1 depends just on 1; :::; n, hence denes a classic pooling function F : n ! .
Specically, this pooling function is given by  / g  1   n where g is a xed
function on H dened as g := p=(p1    pn) (and in particular as p1 n under Common
Prior (CP)). So, our axioms lead to what one might call a multiplicative opinion pool.
Formally, a (classic) opinion pool F : n !  is multiplicative if it is given by
F (1; :::; n) / g  1   n for all 1; :::; n 2 ,
for some xed function g : H ! (0;1).8 The simplest multiplicative rule is that in
which g takes the value 1 everywhere, so that
F (1; :::; n) / 1   n for all 1; :::; n 2 .
Note how multiplicative opinion pools di¤er from the more common linear and geo-
metric opinion pools; these arise from di¤erent axiomatic systems that do not make
information explicit.
In fact, our axioms not only imply that pooling be multiplicative: they characterise
multiplicative pooling if H is nite because every multiplicative rule can be obtained
from suitable priors p1; :::; pn; p 2 .9
Our axioms always lead to multiplicative pooling, but it is of course not enough in
practice to use any multiplicative rule: it matters which one is used, as the resulting
collective beliefs are highly sensitive to the parameter g resp. to p1; :::; pn; p. More
precisely, the choice of multiplicative rule determines how the shared information is
represented in collective beliefs, as shared information is what the prior functions
p1; :::; pn; p reect. The next section addresses this issue.
5 Choosing the collective prior p when there is no
common prior
If the interpretation of the shared information is controversial and hence (CP) fails, the
group needs to determine the collective prior p in Theorem 1s formula. At least three
8As F (1; :::; n) sums to 1, the factor or proportionality is
X
H2H g(H)  1(H)   n(H)
 1
.
9For any multiplicative rule F : n ! , say generated by the function g, if for instance p1 =
::: = pn = p / g 1=(n 1) then g / p=(p1    pn), and hence the multiplicative rule generated by g
coincides with that arising in Theorem 1.
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strategies are imaginable. First, one might dene p as a uniform or maximum-entropy
prior if available. Second, someone, not necessarily a group member, may be appointed
to choose p; either by drawing on his own prior beliefs, or by taking inspiration from
the submitted priors p1; :::; pn, or by using statistical estimation techniques if available.
These two solutions have obvious limitations, including some ad-hoc-ness and a lack of
democracy. A third alternative is to replace p by F (p1; :::; pn); which dene collective
beliefs as
 / 1
p1
   n
pn
F (p1; :::; pn); (5)
where F : n !  is a standard opinion pool. Note that F is used here not to
aggregate peoples actual (posterior) beliefs 1; :::; n but to aggregate their prior
beliefs p1; :::; pn, namely into a "compromise prior". At rst sight, one may wonder
what is gained by formula (5) compared to the standard approach of dening  =
F (1; :::; n) without having to care about priors p1; :::; pn. Does formula (5) not just
shift the classic aggregation problem pooling 1; :::; n into  towards an equally
complex aggregation problem about priors pooling p1; :::; pn into p? In an important
respect, pooling p1; :::; pn is simpler than pooling 1; :::; n: unlike 1; :::; n, the prior
beliefs p1; :::; pn involve no informational asymmetry since each pi is based on the
same (shared) information.10 Hence any disagreement between p1; :::; pn is due solely
to di¤erent interpretations of that same body of information. This may facilitate
the choice of F . For instance, aggregation may be guided by the unanimity/Pareto
principle (which is problematic under informational asymmetry, as we have seen).
Further, aggregation may place equal weights on each or the priors p1; :::; pn (whereas
pooling 1; :::; n may involve the di¢ cult and vague exercise of assigning more weight
to better informed people). The literatures two most prominent types of opinion pools
F : n !  are
linear opinion pools: F (p1; :::; pn) = w1p1 + :::+ wnpn;
geometric opinion pools: F (p1; :::; pn) / pw11    pwnn ;
with weights w1; :::; wi 2 [0; 1] that add up to 1 (where in the geometric pool the factor
of proportionality is chosen such that
P
H2H F (p1; :::; pn)(H) = 1). If F is a linear
resp. geometric opinion pool, our pooling formula (5) becomes
 =
1
p1
   n
pn
(w1p1 + :::+ wnpn) (6)
resp.  / 1
p1
   n
pn
pw11    pwnn =
1
p1 w11
   n
p1 wnn
: (7)
How should the weights w1; :::; wn be chosen in practice? In general, unequal weights
may be justied either by di¤erent information states or by di¤erent competence,
10One might even argue that, while pooling p1; :::; pn into p is possible without using extra in-
formation (due to the informational symmetry), pooling 1; :::; n into  is impossible without extra
information (such as p1; :::; pn):
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i.e. ability to interpret information. The former reason does not apply here, since
p1; :::; pn are by denition based on the same (shared) information. If, in addition,
di¤erences of competence are either inexistent, or unknown, or not to be taken into
account for reasons of procedural fairness, then equal weights w1 = ::: = wn = 1=n
are justied, so that our pooling formula becomes
 =
1
n
1
p1
   n
pn
(p1 + :::+ pn) (8)
resp.  / 1
p
1 1=n
1
   n
p
1 1=n
n
; (9)
which is parameter-free, hence uniquely solves the aggregation problem.
6 External and internal Bayesianity
I now give an argument in defence of dening F in (5) as a geometric (or more
generally, externally Bayesian) opinion pool, hence in defence of our pooling formulae
(7) and (9). Note rst that in (5)  is a function of the vector (p1; 1:::; pn; n) 2
( )n = 2n, containing every persons prior and posterior.
Denition 1 A "generalised opinion pool" ("GOP") or "generalised probability ag-
gregation rule" is a function G : 2n ! :
Unlike a standard opinion pool F : n ! ; a GOP G also takes as inputs the pis,
i.e. peoples interpretations of the shared information. As shown above, our axioms
imply that a GOP G should take the form (5), i.e. the form
G(p1; 1; :::; pn; n) / 1
p1
   n
pn
F (p1; :::; pn) (10)
where F : n !  is a standard opinion pool that merges the priors p1; :::; pn.
From a Bayesian perspective, two natural conditions may be imposed on a GOP,
to be called external and internal Bayesianity. The former is an analogue of the
equally-named classic condition for standard opinion pools F : it should not matter
whether information arrives before or after pooling, i.e. pooling should commute
with Bayesian updating. Formally, for every belief p 2  and ("likelihood") function
l : H ! (0; 1] the ("updated") belief pl 2  is dened by
pl(H) :=
l(H)p(H)P
H02H l(H
0)p(H 0)
; in short pl / lp: (11)
Here, l is interpreted as a likelihood function P (Ej:) for some observation E, so that
pl is a posterior probability. A standard opinion pool F : n !  is called externally
Bayesian if
F (pl1; :::; p
l
n) = F (p1; :::; pn)
l
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for every prole (p1; :::; pn) 2 n and ("likelihood") function l : H ! (0; 1] (Madansky
(1964)). In particular, geometric opinion pools are externally Bayesian. An analogous
concept can be dened for GOPs:
Denition 2 A GOP G : 2n !  is called "externally Bayesian" if
G(pl1; 
l
1; :::; p
l
n; 
l
n) = G(p1; 1; :::; pn; n)
l
for every prole (p1; 1; :::; pn; n) 2 2n and ("likelihood") function l : H ! (0; 1]:
On the left hand side of this equation not only all posteriors are updated (li), but
also all priors (pli), because the incoming information is observed by everybody, hence
part of the shared information, hence contained in the priors.
While external Bayesianity requires that it be irrelevant whether pooling happens
before or after updating, a di¤erent question is whether it matters who in the group
has observed a given information. Internal Bayesianity requires that it be irrelevant
whether every or just a single person obtains a given information:
Denition 3 A GOP G : 2n !  is called "internally Bayesian" if, for each person
i;
G(p1; 1; :::; pi 1; i 1; pi; li; pi+1; i+1; :::; pn; n) = G(p
l
1; 
l
1; :::; p
l
n; 
l
n)
for every prole (p1; 1; :::; pn; n) 2 2n and ("likelihood") function l : H ! (0; 1]:
On the left hand side of this equation, is prior is not updated (pi; not pli), because
the incoming information, being observed just by person i; is not part of the shared
information, hence not reected in any prior. Internal Bayesianity is based on the idea
that the collective probabilities should incorporate all information available somewhere
in the group, whether it is held by a single or every person. External and internal
Bayesianity together imply that, for each person i,
G(p1; 1; :::; pi 1; i 1; pi; li; pi+1; i+1; :::; pn; n) = G(p1; 1; :::; pn; n)
l
for every prole (p1; 1; :::; pn; n) 2 2n and ("likelihood") function l : H ! (0; 1]:
It turns out that, if a GOP G takes the form (10), then external and internal
Bayesianity are in fact equivalent, and equivalent to external Bayesianity of F :
Theorem 2 If a generalised opinion pool G : 2n !  has the form (10) where
F : n !  is any opinion pool, the following conditions are equivalent:
(i) G is externally Bayesian;
(ii) G is internally Bayesian;
(iii) F is externally Bayesian.
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So, if one desires G to be externally or internally Bayesian, one is bound to use an
externally Bayesian opinion pool F in our pooling formula (10), for instance a geomet-
ric opinion pool F , which leads to pooling formula (7), hence to (9) in the equal-weight
case. There also exist more complex (non-geometric) externally Bayesian opinion
pools F; characterised in full generality by Genest, McConway, and Schervish (1986,
Theorem 2.5), but geometric ones become the only solutions if jHj  3 and F has
some additional properties (see Genest, McConway, and Schervish (1986), Corollary
4.5).
Proof. I show that (i) is equivalent with each of (ii) and (iii). By (10);
G(pl1; 
l
1; :::; p
l
n; 
l
n) /
l1
pl1
   
l
n
pln
F (pl1; :::; p
l
n);
and hence by (11)
G(pl1; 
l
1; :::; p
l
n; 
l
n) /
l1
lp1
   ln
lpn
F (pl1; :::; p
l
n) =
1
p1
   n
pn
F (pl1; :::; p
l
n): (12)
On the other hand, again by (10) and (11);
G(p1; 1; :::; pn; n)
l / l1
p1
   n
pn
F (p1; :::; pn) / 1
p1
   n
pn
F (p1; :::; pn)
l: (13)
Relations (12) and (13) together immediately imply that G is externally Bayesian if
and only if F is externally Bayesian. Further, again by (10) and (11);
G(p1; 1; :::; pi 1; i 1; pi; li; pi+1; i+1; :::; pn; n) / l
1
p1
   n
pn
F (p1; :::; pn)
/ 1
p1
   n
pn
F (p1; :::; pn)
l:
This together with (12) implies that G is internally Bayesian if and only it F is
externally Bayesian. 
7 When is information independent, when not?
Let us go back to the foundations of the model. A restrictive assumption is Inde-
pendent Information (Ind). An important source for failure of (Ind) is what I call
"subgroup information", that is, information held by more than one but less than all
persons. I will prove that, under certain conditions, (Ind) holds if and only if there
is no subgroup information. This defends the above pooling rules in the absence of
subgroup information, but puts them into question under subgroup information.
By a person is observation set I mean, informally, the (possibly quite enormous)
collection of is relevant observations/items of information. (Formally, one may dene
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is observation set as a set Oi of non-empty "observations" O  
.11) In the case of
a jury faced with hypotheses about the defendants guilt, is observation set might
include the observations "an insecure smile on the defendants face", "the defendants
ngerprint near the crime scene", "two contradictory statements by witness x", etc.
observations of
person 1 only
observations of
person 2 only
shared
observations
observations of
person 1 only
observations of
person 2 only
shared
observations
observations of
person 3 only
! !
Figure 1: Observation sets in a group of n = 2 perons (no subgroup information), and
a group of n = 3 persons (with subgroup information marked by "!")
Figure 1 shows observation sets, not sets of possible worlds A  
. These two
concepts are in fact opposed to each other: the larger the observation set, the smal-
ler the corresponding set of worlds (in which the observations hold); the union of
observation sets compares to the intersection of the sets of worlds.12
Here is the problem. Consider any observation contained in the observation sets
of more than one but less than all persons i something impossible in groups of size
n = 2 but possible in larger groups, as illustrated by the "!" elds in Figure 1. This
observation is not part of the shared information, but of the personal information Ei of
many individuals i. Such subgroup information typically creates positive correlations
between the Eis in question. As a stylised example, consider a jury of n = 3 jurors
faced with the hypothesis of guilt of the defendant (H). All jurors have read the charge
(shared information), and moreover juror 1 has listened to the rst witness report and
observed the defendants nervousness (E1), juror 2 has listened to the second witness
report and observed the defendants smiles (E2), and juror 3 has listened to both
witness reports and had a private chat with the defendant (E3). Note the subgroup
information of jurors 1 and 3, and that of jurors 2 and 3, which typically causes E3
to be positively correlated with E1 and with E2: By contrast, individuals 1 and 2
together have no subgroup information. This situation is depicted in Figure 1 on the
right.
To formally clarify the relationship between subgroup information and independ-
ence violation, some preparation is needed.
11An observation made by every person is represented by the sure event O = 
, because 
 is
interpreted as containing the worlds that are possible under shared information. Formally, O 2
O1 \ ::: \ On implies O = 
.
12Formally, to an observation set O corresponds the set of worlds \O2OO  
, interpreted as 
 if
O = ;. Thus is information Ei equals \O2Oin(O1[:::[On)O; the intersection of all of is observations
except from any shared one; by footnote 11, this actually equals \O2OiO.
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Denition 4 A "subgroup" is a non-empty subset M of the group N := f1; :::; ng. A
subgroup is "proper" if it contains more than one but less than all persons.
To formalise the notion of subgroup information, suppose that to each subgroupM
there is a non-empty event EM  
,Ms "exclusively shared information", represent-
ing all information held by each of and only the persons in M , where by assumption
 Ei = \figMNEM for all persons i (as i has observed those EM with i 2M);13
 EN = 
 (as any world ! 2 
 is assumed possible under the shared information);
 each EM belongs to A, the domain of the probability measure P (which holds
in particular if A contains all subsets of 
).
For instance, the "!" elds in Figure 1 represent Ef1;2g, Ef1;3g and Ef2;3g.14
What we have to exclude is that a proper subgroup M exclusively shares inform-
ation; in other words, EM must be the no-information event 
:
No Subgroup Information (NoSI) All proper subgroups M have EM = 
 (i.e.
do not exclusively share any information).
This condition is empty if there are just n = 2 individuals, it requires Ef1;2g =
Ef1;3g = Ef2;3g = 
 if n = 3, and it requires the "!" elds in Figure 1 to be empty.
Finally, consider the following independence assumption:
(Ind) The events EM ; ; 6=M  N; are (P -)independent conditional on each H 2 H:
(Ind) is less problematic than (Ind) in that the EMs are, unlike the Eis, based
on non-overlapping observation sets. Indeed, a subgroup Ms exclusively shared in-
formation EM , by the very meaning of "exclusively", represents di¤erent observations
than any other subgroups exclusively shared information.15 For simplicity, suppose
nally that
P (A) > 0 for every non-empty event A 2 A. (14)
Theorem 3 Assume (Ind) and (14). Then:
(a) Independent Information (Ind) is equivalent to No Subgroup Information (NoSI);
(b) specically, if EM 6= 
 for proper subgroup M , then conditional on some H 2
H the personal observations Ei; i 2 M; are pairwise positively correlated (i.e.
P (Ei \ EjjH) > P (EijH)P (EjjH) for any two distinct i; j 2M).
13Why not rather assume that Ei = \figM(NEM ; as Ei should not contain information held by
everybody? In fact, both assumption are equivalent since by EN = 
 an additional intersection with
EN has no e¤ect.
14EM is interpretable as the intersection \O2(\i2MOi)n([i=2MOi)O of all observations O contained
in each of the observation sets Oi; i 2M; but in none of the observation sets Oi; i =2M; where this
intersection is 
 if (\i2MOi)n([i=2MOi) = ;.
15(Ind) holds if the observations in O1 [ ::: [ On are mutually (conditionally) independent.
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Proof. I prove part (a); the proof includes a proof of part (b).
(i) First, assume (NoSI). Then we have, for all persons i,
Ei = \figMNEM = Efig \
\figMN&jM j2EM = Efig \ 
 = Efig: (15)
Conditional on any H 2 H, by (Ind) the events EM ; ; 6= M  N; are independent,
hence so are Ef1g; :::; Efng, and hence so are E1; :::; En by (15).
(ii) Now assume (NoSI) is violated, and let M be a proper subgroup with EM
 6=

: I show that the events Ei; i 2M; are pairwise positively correlated conditional on
at least oneH 2 H, which proves part (b) and also completes the proof of part (a) since
E1; :::; En are then not independent conditional on H: Let i; j 2 M be distinct. By
EM
 6= 
 and (14) I have P (EM) < 1: So there exists anH 2 H with P (EMjH) < 1.
Since Ei = \figMNEM , we have by (Ind) P (EijH) = figMNP (EM jH): The
analogous argument for j yields P (EjjH) = fjgMNP (EM jH): So
P (EijH)P (EjjH) =

figMNP (EM jH)
 fjgMNP (EM jH) : (16)
Further, we have
Ei \ Ej = [\figMNEM ] \ [\fjgMNEM ] = [\figMNEM ] \ [\fjgMNnfigEM ]:
So, by (Ind),
P (Ei \ Ej) = [figMNP (EM)] [fjgMNnfigP (EM)]: (17)
The relations (16) and (17) together entail P (Ei \ Ej) > P (EijH)P (EjjH); because
expression (16) equals expression (17) multiplied with the factor fi;jgMNP (EM);
which is smaller than 1 since it contains the term P (EM
jH) < 1. 
8 Opinion pooling in the presence of subgroup in-
formation
One may always try to "remove" subgroup information through active information
sharing prior to aggregation: all proper subgroups with exclusively shared information
communicate this information to the rest of the group. In Figure 1, the observations in
each "!" eld are communicated to the third person, and in the above jury example the
subgroups f1; 3g and f2; 3g communicate the exact content of the rst resp. second
witness report to the third juror. Having thus removed any subgroup information,
(NoSI) and hence (in view of Theorem 3) Independent Information (Ind) hold, so that
opinion pooling can proceed along the lines of Sections 2-5.
But suppose now that such information sharing is not feasible, e.g. due to the
complexity of subgroup information. Then (NoSI) fails, and hence (Ind) fails, so that
we need to modify our pooling formula. It is at rst not obvious whether and how
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one can generalise Theorem 1 to arbitrary information overlaps, i.e. whether and how
collective beliefs can incorporate all information spread around the group. The gener-
alisation is possible, as will be seen. Roughly speaking, we have to replace Theorem 1s
axioms of Individual Bayesian Rationality (IBR) and Independent Information (Ind)
by corresponding axioms based on subgroups rather than individuals. Theorem 1s
two other axioms, Acceptance of Likelihoods (AL) and Common Prior (CP), will not
anymore appear explicitly, but are build implicitly into the model, as explained in a
moment. The adapted axioms will again lead to unique collective beliefs , calculated
in a somewhat more complicated way than in Theorem 1.
First, let me state the model ingredients. On the informational side, Theorem 1s
model contained individual information E1; :::; En; the present model moreover con-
tains each subgroupMs exclusively shared information EM , as introduced in the last
section. Recall that in Theorem 1s model (in its common prior version) people provide
individual beliefs 1; :::; n and a common prior belief p based on the groups shared
information; so, technically, the model contained the beliefs 1; :::; n; p reecting the
shared information of the improper subgroups f1g; :::; fng; N , respectively. Our new
model adds to this the beliefs reecting the shared information of proper subgroups
M  N . More precisely, it su¢ ces here to consider subgroups with exclusively share
information: letM be a set of subgroups M  N containing at least the (proper or
improper) subgroups M with exclusively shared information, i.e. with EM 6= 
; and
let N 2M without loss of generality.16 Each subgroup M inM submits a probabil-
ity function pM 2 , representing Ms probability assignments based on Ms shared
information (shared information need not be exclusively shared, i.e. may be known to
other persons too; see Denition 5 below). Theorem 1s model (in the common prior
version) is the special case that M = ff1g; :::; fng; Ng (= fM : M is an improper
subgroupg) with pf1g = 1; :::; pfng = n; pN = p. In the last sections jury example
with n = 3 individuals, we may put M = ff1g; f2g; f3g; f1; 3g; f2; 3g; f1; 2; 3gg be-
cause f1; 2g has no exclusively shared information.
In practice, every non-singleton subgroupM 2M will have to "sit together", nd
out about its shared information, and come up with a resulting probability function
pM . As mentioned, this amounts to a common prior assumption: the present model
allows di¤erence in belief to come only from di¤erence in information. But, rather
than making this assumption explicit by a condition analogous to the earlier Common
Prior (CP), the assumption is implicit by not indexing pM by individuals i, and by
using P instead of Pi throughout, thereby implicitly assuming that Pi(A) = P (A) for
all A 2 Ai \ A.17
The technique to calculate the (collective) belief  2  from the subgroup beliefs
16One may always dene M as containing all subgroups, but in practice this maximal choice
adds unnecessary steps to the recusive pooling procedure introduced below. The minimal choice is
M = fM : ; 6=M ( N and EM 6= 
g [ fNg.
17By using P rather than P1; :::; Pn I implicitly make a common prior assumption that is global,
i.e. is not like (CP) restricted to the set H of relevant hypotheses. I thereby implicitly also assume
(AL).
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pM , M 2 M, will be recursive. Let me rst illustrate it using the last sections jury
example. Here, n = 3 andM = ff1g; f2g; f3g; f1; 3g; f2; 3g; f1; 2; 3gg. So, functions
pf1g; pf2g; pf3g; pf1;3g; pf2;3g and pf1;2;3g are submitted. The recursion works as follows,
where I use a slightly simplied version of the later notation and skip all formal
justications:
 First, merge pf1;3g and pf2;3g into a function pf1;3g;f2;3g that combines f1; 3gs
shared information and f1; 3gs shared information. One may apply Theorem 1s
formula: pf1;3g;f2;3g / pf1;3gpf2;3g=pf1;2;3g:
 Next, merge pf1g and pf2g into a function pf1g;f2g that combines f1gs and f2gs
information. One may apply Theorem 1s formula: pf1g;f2g / pf1gpf2g=pf1;2g; where
pf1;2g is dened as pf1;2;3g because the subgroup f1; 2g has no exclusively shared in-
formation.
 Finally, merge pf1g;f2g and pf3g into the function  = pf1g;f2g;f3g that combines
f1gs, f2gs and f3gs information. Again, one may apply Theorem 1s formula:
 = pf1g;f2g;f3g / pf1g;f2gpf3g=pf1;3g;f2;3g:
Now I come to the formal treatment. Recall that is information Ei equals
\figMNEM , i.e. i knows precisely the conjunction of what the subgroups containing
i exclusively share. This generalises as follows to:
Denition 5 A subgroupMs "shared information" is dened as EM := \MM 0NEM 0
(the conjunction of all information exclusively shared by some supergroup of M).
EM represents what is known to at least all members of M as opposed to Ms
exclusively shared information EM , known exactly all members ofM . Taking the case
of a singleton subgroup M = fig, the event Efig coincides with Ei. Also, note that
P (EM) > 0 and P (EM) > 0 for each subgroup M
because P (EM); P (EM)  P (\;6=M 0NEM 0) = P (E1 \ ::: \ En) > 0. The following
condition translates Individual Bayesian Rationality (IBR) to subgroups inM:
Subgroup Bayesian Rationality (SBR) pM(H) = P (HjEM) for every subgroup
M 2M and hypothesis H 2 H.
As in Theorem 1, we aim for collective beliefs that satisfy Collective Bayesian
Rationality (CBR); that is, we require that
(H) = P (HjE1 \ ::: \ En) for each hypothesis H 2 H;
a condition that may be rewritten in several equivalent ways since (by Denition 5)
E1 \ ::: \ En = Ef1g \ ::: \ Efng = \;6=MNEM = \;6=MNEM :
As a technical tool to construct collective beliefs  satisfying (CBR), I need to intro-
duce beliefs of abstract individuals.
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Denition 6 An "abstract individual" is a non-empty set A of subgroups M ; its
"order" is order(A) := minfjM j :M 2 Ag; the size of a smallest subgroup in A:
The beliefs pf1;3g;f2;3g; pf1g;f2g; ::: dened in the example above are in fact the beliefs
of the abstract individuals ff1; 3g; f2; 3gg; ff1g; f2gg; :::More generally, I interpret an
abstract individual A as a hypothetical agent who knows the shared information of
any subgroupM 2 A (and no more). For instance, A = ff1; 3g; f2; 3gg knows f1; 3gs
shared information and f2; 3gs shared information. As information is thus given by
\M2AEM . I will calculate for each abstract individual A a function pA 2  reecting
precisely As information \M2AEM , i.e. such that
pA(H) = P (Hj \M2A EM) for each H 2 H: (18)
Specically, I calculate pA by backward recursion over order(A): pA is calculated rst
for order(A) = n; then for order(A) = n  1; ..., then for order(A) = 1. This nally
yields ; since by (CBR) and (18)  = P (:jEf1g \ ::: \ Efng) = pA where A is the
abstract individual ff1g; f2g; :::; fngg of order 1. In the recursive construction, the
main steps are to calculate from beliefs pA and pA of abstract individuals A and A
the belief pA[A of the abstract individual A [ A whose information combines the
information of A and A: To derive pA[A from pA and pA, I generalise the formula of
Theorem 1 to (two) abstract individuals. To do so, the notion of shared information is
crucial. What information do A and A share? They share precisely the information
held by the abstract individual
A _ A := fM [M :M 2 A and M 2 Ag:
The reason is: the information A and A share is precisely the information that A
knows and A knows, i.e. that some subgroup in A shares and some subgroup in A
shares, i.e. that some union M [M with M 2 A and M 2 A shares. So, when
combining beliefs pA and pA, A _ As belief pA_A plays the role of the common
prior p in Theorem 1: More precisely, the crucial result on how to combine beliefs of
abstract individuals states as follows (and is proved later):
Lemma 1 Assume (Ind). Consider abstract individuals B and C, form the abstract
individuals B _ C and B [ C, and let pB; pC ; pB_C ; pB[C be four beliefs in . If
pB; pC ; pB_C are all given by (18), then the function pBpC=pB_C is proportional to
a belief in  (equivalently, has a nite sum
X
H2H
pB(H)pC(H)=pB_C(H)), and if
moreover pB[C is this belief (i.e. pB[C / pBpC=pB_C) then pB[C is given by (18).
The formula in Lemma 1 guides us in assigning beliefs to abstract individuals.
The assignment is recursive, with another nested recursion in "Case 2":
Denition 7 Dene the beliefs pA 2  of abstract individual A by the following
backward recursion on order(A):
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 Let order(A) = n. Then A = fNg. Dene pA := pN :
 Let order(A) = k < n and assume pA0 is already dened for order(A0) > k.
Case 1: jAj = 1. Then A = fMg: If M 2 M, dene pA = pM : If M =2 M,
consider the abstract individual A0 := fM[fig : i =2Mg containing all subgroups
with exactly one person added to M (interpretation: A and A0 have the same
information by M =2 M) and dene pA := pA0 (where pA0 is already dened by
order(A0) = k + 1):
Case 2: jAj > 1. Dene pA by another recursion on jfM 2 A : jM j = kgj, the
number of subgroups in A of size k:
 Let jfM 2 A : jM j = kgj = 1. Then A = fMg [ A; where jM j = k
and order(A) > k. Dene pA by pA / pfMgpA=pfMg_A (where pfMg
is already dened in case 1, and pA and pfMg_A are already dened by
order(A) > k and order(fMg _ A) > k).
 Let jfM 2 A : jM j = kgj = l > 1 and assume pA is already dened for
jfM 2 A : jM j = kgj < l (and order(A) = k). Then A = fMg [ A
with jM j = k and jfM 2 A : jMj = kgj = l   1: Dene pA by pA /
pfMgpA=pfMg_A (where pfMg is already dened in case 1, pA is already
dened by jfM 2 A : jMj = kgj = l   1, and pfMg_A is already dened
by order(fMg _ A) > k).
The existence and uniqueness of the above-dened beliefs pA follows from the
recursion theorem.18 On the last recursion step we reach the beliefs pA of abstract
individuals of order 1, hence in particular the belief of A = ff1g; :::; fngg, and this is
the desired belief that incorporates the groups full information:
Theorem 4 If (SBR), (CBR) and (Ind) hold, the collective belief  is given by
 = pff1g;:::;fngg, the belief of the abstract individual ff1g; :::; fngg.
I rst prove Lemma 1 and then Theorem 4.
Proof of Lemma 1. Assume (Ind). Let B;C be abstract individuals, and pB; pC ;
pB_C ; pB[C 2 . Suppose pB; pC ; pB_C satisfy (18). For all abstract individuals A;
18A technical detail is left implicit in Denition 7: in each bullet point of Case 2, I have dened pA as
the member of  that is proportional to the function a certain function f (= pfMgpA=pfMg_A), but
this is only meaningful if there exists a g 2  with g / f (i.e. if f has a nite sum
X
H2H f(H) <1
so that f can be normalised to a function in ). Existence does indeed holds under Theorem 4s
axioms (see the proof of Theorem 4, which draws on Lemma 1), but strictly speaking this fact should
not be anticipated in the recursive denition. This is why Denition 7 strictly speaking needs the
following extension. Fix an arbitrary belief  2 , and add to Cases 1 and 2 the clause that pA
is dened as  if the previous prescription does not apply (i.e. if there is non-existence, as just
discussed). The added clause can then be shown to never apply (under Theorem 4s axioms).
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put
A := fM  N :M 0 M for some M 0 2 Ag;
the set of supergroups of subgroups in A: By (18), pB_C = P (:j \M2B_C EM); where
by Denition 5
\M2B_CEM = \M2B_C \MM 0N EM 0 = \M2B_CEM :
So,
pB_C = P (:jE) with E := \M2B_CEM : (19)
Analogously, by (18), pB = P (:j \M2B EM); where by Denition 5
\M2BEM = \M2B \MM 0N EM 0 = \M2BEM = EB \ E
with EB := \M2BnB_CEM . So pB = P (:jEB \ E); and hence by Bayesrule
pB / P (:jE)P (EBj: \ E): (20)
By an analogous argument for C; we have
pC / P (:jE)P (EC j: \ E); (21)
where EC := \M2CnB_CEM . By (19), (20) and (21) we have
pBpC=pB_C / [P (:jE)P (EBj: \ E)] [P (:jE)P (EC j: \ E)] =P (:jE)
= P (:jE)P (EBj: \ E)P (EC j: \ E): (22)
(Ind) implies that, for each H 2 H, the events EB; EC ; E are independent given H,
and hence EB; EC are independent given H \ E: So
P (EBj: \ E)P (EC j: \ E) = P (EB \ EC j: \ E):
Substituting this into (22) and then applying Bayesrule, we obtain
pBpC=pB_C / P (:jE)P (EB \ EC j: \ E) / P (:jEB \ EC \ E) 2 :
Now suppose pB[C = P (:jEB \ EC \ E). We may rewrite EB \ EC \ E as
\M2B[CEM = \M2B[C \MM 0N EM = \M2B[CEM ,
and hence pB[C equals P (:j \M2B[C EM), i.e. satises (18). 
Proof of Theorem 4. Assume (SBR) and (Ind). By backward induction on the
order of A I show that each abstract individual A has belief pA satisfying (18). This
in particular implies that ff1g; :::; fngg has belief
pff1g;:::;fngg(H) = P (HjE1 \ ::: \ En) for each H 2 H,
so that under (CBR) we have  = pff1g;:::;fngg, as desired.
Denote by A the set of abstract individuals A. The recursion proceeds as follows.
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 If order(A) = n; then A = fNg; and by denition pA = pN : So by (SBR)
pA = P (:jEN) = P (:j \M2A EM), as desired.
 Now let order(A) = k < n; and assume (18) holds for all A0 2 A with
order(A0) > k: I have to show that pA = P (:j \M2A EM).
Case 1: jAj = 1. Then A = fMg with jM j = k: If M 2 M, then by denition
pA = pM ; so by (SBR) pA = P (:jEM) = P (:j \M 02A EM 0), as desired. Now
assume M =2 M. Then by denition pA = pA0 with A0 := fM [ fig : i =2 Mg.
Since order(A0) = k+1; the induction hypothesis yields pA0 = P (:j\M 02A0EM 0);
hence pA = P (:j \M 02A0 EM 0): So I have to show that \M 02A0EM 0 = EM . By
Denition 5;
EM = \MM 0NEM 0 = EM \
n
\M 02A0
h
\M 0M 00NEM 00
io
:
In this, EM = 
 (by M =2M) and \M 0M 00NEM 00 = EM 0 (by Denition 5). So
EM = \M 02A0EM 0 ; as desired.
Case 2: jAj > 1: I show pA = P (:j \M2A EM) by induction on the number
jfM 2 A : jM j = kgj of subgroups in A of size k:
 Let jfM 2 A : jM j = kgj = 1. Then A = fMg [ A with jM j = k and
order(A) > k. Then pA was dened as the function in  proportional to
pfMgpA=pfMg_A; let me show that (i) such a function does indeed exists
(see footnote 18 on potential inexistence) and (ii) satises (18), as desired.
Now, pfMg satises (18) by Case 1, and pA and pfMg_A satisfy (18) by
order(A) > k and order(fMg_A) > k (and the k-induction hypothesis).
So, by Lemma 1; the function pfMgpA=pfMg_A is proportional to a function
in , so that pA is well-dened. Also by Lemma 1, this function pA satises
(18), as desired.
 Let jfM 2 A : jM j = kgj = l > 1, and assume A satises (18) whenever
jfM 2 A : jM j = kgj < l (and order(A) = k). By denition, pA /
pfMgpA=pfMg_A, where A = fMg [ A with jM j = k and jfM 2 A :
jMj = kgj = l   1: Again, we have to show that pA is well-dened (i.e. 
indeed contains a function proportional to pfMgpA=pfMg_A) and satises
(18). pfMg satises (18) by Case 1, pA satises (18) by jfM 2 A : jMj =
kgj = l   1 (and the l-induction hypothesis), and pfMg_A satises (18) by
order(fMg _ A) > k (and the k-induction hypothesis). So, by Lemma 1;
pA is well-dened and satises (18). 
9 Conclusion
The above model interprets opinion pooling as information pooling: collective be-
liefs should build in the groups entire information, be it shared or personal. By the
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pooling formulae I obtained, collective beliefs should account for informational asym-
metries not by placing higher weights on beliefs of better informed individuals but by
incorporating peoples prior beliefs in addition to their actual (i.e. posterior) beliefs.
In practice, people have either to agree on a common prior belief p, i.e. to agree
on how to interpret the shared information, or they have to submit their possibly
diverging prior beliefs p1; :::; pn. Based on simple axioms, Theorem 1 shows how to
aggregate the (prior and posterior) beliefs into a collective belief. The formula denes
a multiplicative opinion pool: the collective probability function  is proportional to
the product of the individual probability functions 1; :::; n and a function g (that
depends on prior beliefs). Such multiplicative opinion pooling contrasts with the more
common linear or geometric pooling.
More precisely, Theorem 1 suggests that, based on individual beliefs 1; :::; n,
the collective beliefs  should be dened by  / 1   n=pn 1 if people agree on
a common prior p, and by  / 1
p1
   n
pn
F (p1; :::; pn) if people have arbitrary priors
p1; :::; pn, where F is a standard opinion pool. I have suggested that F should be an-
onymous (i.e. symmetric in its arguments) because the prior beliefs it pools are based
on the same (shared) information, giving no individual an informational superiority.
More specically, I have suggested to dene F as unweighted geometric pooling, be-
cause this generates appealing properties shown in Theorem 2. This choice of F gives
collective beliefs the form
 / 1
p
1 1=n
1
   n
p
1 1=n
n
:
A crucial axiom underlying this formula is that personal information is independent.
By Theorem 3, independence is threatened by the possibility of subgroup information,
i.e. of information held by more than one but less than all individuals. Theorem 4
therefore generalises the aggregation rule to arbitrary information distributions (al-
lowing for subgroup information). The generalisation is unique, but assumes that each
subgroup with subgroup information agrees on how to interpret this information, a
kind of common prior assumption. Dropping this assumption would have gone beyond
the scope of this paper, but it might be an interesting route for future research.
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